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INTRODUCTION 
If 100 criminologists were gathered in a room, they would struggle to 
find consensus over most issues of crime and criminal justice. The 
definition of crime; its causes, nature, and distribution; its impact on 
society; the most appropriate or effective responses to criminal 
behaviour—all these issues remain sources of heated debate and 
trenchant disagreement. And yet, irrespective of their theoretical or 
methodological perspective, all would probably agree on two 
seemingly incontestable criminological ‘facts’. First, the news media 
distort the ‘true’ picture of crime and criminal justice. And second, this 
distortion matters because it is somehow detrimental to society. 
Perspectives on the negative outcomes of this distortion will vary 
across a diversity of concerns, including: the generation of public 
misunderstanding of the problem of crime and the functioning and 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system; the politicization of law 
and order; the criminalization of marginalized groups; and the 
formation of punitive crime control policies. These ‘bad news’ 
criminological ‘facts’ lie at the heart of most crime news research.  
Steve Chibnall’s (1977: 1) observation 40 years ago that crime 
news remained ‘a curiosity of no more than marginal interest’ for 
mainstream media researchers and criminologists still applies today. 
Back then, the principal media-crime research interest was in 
evaluating the possible behavioural effects, usually upon children, of 
media portrayals of sex and violence (Cohen and Young, 1973). The 
lack of interest was incomprehensible to Chibnall, given that news is 
one of the central repositories for and creators of public knowledge. 
The news media: 
 
exert a considerable influence over our perceptions of groups and 
lifestyles of which we have little first-hand experience. They have the 
power to create issues and define the boundaries of debates and, while 
they may not be able to manipulate our opinions in any direct sense—
creating attitudes to replace old ones—they can organise opinion and 
develop world views by providing structures of understanding into 
which isolated and unarticulated attitudes and beliefs may be fitted. 
They provide interpretations, symbols of identification, collective 
values and myths which are able to transcend the moral boundaries 
within a society like Britain (Chibnall 1977: 226) 
 
It is our position that, despite widespread consensus that crime news 
distorts and that this distortion has negative consequences for society, 
the dynamic relations between news power, crime, and criminal justice 
remain under-researched and under-conceptualized. In this chapter it 
is not our intention to present a comprehensive overview of the 
existing research on crime news. Such overviews can be found 
elsewhere (Greer 2010a, b, 2013; Greer and Reiner 2012; Jewkes 
2015). Our aims are more specific. First, we revisit two key concepts 
that continue to dominate UK crime news research, but tend to do so 
in caricatured form: news values and moral panic. Although these 
concepts are still important for understanding news power, their 
institutionalization and taxonomical application in criminological 
research has marginalized analysis of dramatic shifts in the nature of 
crime news, the markets in which it circulates, and its power to shape 
crime consciousness and criminal justice rhetoric and practice. Second, 
we consider the work of penologists who in the 1990s resituated crime 
news within a context of wider social change by identifying the media 
as a key driver of the ‘punitive turn’. Third, we set out our own position 
on developments that currently are transforming the relations 
between news power, crime, and criminal justice. While these 
developments have global significance, our empirical focus remains in 
the UK because its news media system is in important respects unique 
(Tunstall 1996). Most important is the existence of an overwhelmingly 
conservative tabloidized national newspaper market, run by powerful 
corporations that resource fully integrated 24-7 hard copy and online 
operations. Amidst ongoing debate about the death of print news and 
the contemporary crisis of professional journalism (Alexander et al. 
2016; Rusbridger 2008), we propose that UK newspaper corporations 
are in fact fighting to increase their agenda-setting power. In response 
to the emergence of an ultra-competitive digital information market 
they continue to develop a distinctive brand of adversarial journalism 
that is working at the edges of what is legally permissible in order to 
extend their influence (Brock 2013). Because of tighter legal 
restrictions around objectivity and impartiality, the UK’s broadcast 
news media routinely follow the national press agenda (Bromley 1998). 
Consequently, newspapers remain pivotal in setting the public and 
policy agendas around crime and criminal justice. 
The technological, cultural, and economic transformation of the 
news market has increased corporate power to define what is news 
and, in the context of this chapter, what is crime news. Potential crime 
news stories circulate endlessly, intermediatized across and between 
different platforms as ever-repeating, ever-proliferating circuits 
beyond the control of any one group or institution. In this context of 
informational chaos and contestation, UK newspaper corporations are 
reasserting their authority as powerful filters and legitimators, 
revalidating the distinction between ‘information’ and ‘news’ and 
imposing their own brand of interpretive order. We identify the 
emergence of ‘trial by media’ and ‘scandal hunting’ as illustrative of the 
shifting balance of news power in this digital market. These news 
practices are capable simultaneously of providing an alternative forum 
for delivering ‘justice’ to victims failed by the state and inflicting 
potentially devastating reputational damage on convicted and alleged 
offenders, criminal justice authorities, politicians, policy elites, and 
‘failing’ institutions. We propose that in-depth crime news research has 
fallen off the criminological radar at a time when newspaper 
corporations have reconstituted and dramatically extended their 
power to shape crime consciousness and influence official rhetoric and 
practice. It is in this intermediatized context that we situate the shift 
from criminal justice to media justice. 
 
NEWS POWER, NEWS VALUES, AND MORAL PANIC 
The 1970s and 1980s represented a high point of crime news research. 
Scholars were motivated by an interdisciplinary concern to move 
beyond psychological positivism’s preoccupations with direct media 
effects in order to develop a deeper and more nuanced understanding 
of news power at a time of radical social change. Of the numerous 
crime news studies produced in this period (Halloran et al. 1970; 
Chibnall 1977; Cohen 1972; Cohen and Young 1973; Hall et al. 1978; 
Katz 1987; Ericson et al. 1987, 1989, 1991), three stand out as having 
defined the field: Cohen’s (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The 
Creation of Mods and Rockers, Chibnall’s (1977) Law and Order News: 
An Analysis of Crime Reporting in the British Press, and Hall et al.’s. 
(1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. These 
studies, produced in dialogue with each other, have maintained their 
influence largely because of the two organizing concepts they 
collectively developed: news values and moral panic. 
 
NEWS VALUES 
Chibnall (1977: x-xi) identified crime as the news category that allows 
news organizations to act as barometers of the public temper at any 
given moment: 
 
Crime news may serve as a focus for the articulation of shared morality 
and communal sentiments. A chance not simply to speak to the 
community but to speak for the community, against all that the 
criminal outsider represents, to delineate the shape of the threat, to 
advocate a response, to eulogise on conformity to established norms 
and values, and to warn of the consequences of deviance. In short, 
crime news provides a chance for a newspaper to appropriate the 
moral conscience of its readership. 
 
Chibnall’s Marxist framework built on Halloran et al.’s (1970) classic 
analysis of press and television reporting of the 1968 Vietnam 
demonstrations in London’s Grosvenor Square. He argued that news 
power resides in the ability of journalists, working within the 
constraints of professional conventions, source relationships, and legal 
limitations, to select and construct what is and what is not crime news. 
In selecting and constructing events as newsworthy journalists are 
guided by eight professional ‘news values’. These news values are 
seldom written down and many journalists struggle to articulate them 
when asked. Nevertheless, all to some extent internalize a ‘sense’ of 
‘news’, which provides a stock of professional knowledge enabling the 
informed assessment of ‘newsworthiness’. The eight universal news 
values Chibnall identifies are: immediacy, dramatization, 
personalization, simplification, titillation, conventionalism, structured 
access, and novelty. These news values can be refined, inflected, and 
augmented by other criteria to add greater insight or gravity in the 
reporting of particular ‘types’ of crime. For example, at least five 
informal rules of relevance guide journalists’ treatment of violence by 
asserting the importance of: visible and spectacular acts, sexual and 
political connotations, graphic description and presentation, individual 
pathology, and deterrence and repression (Chibnall 1977: 776). 
Understanding news values helps to make sense of crime news 
selection and content. For example, it explains why violence in public 
places between strangers tends to be newsworthy, whilst violence in 
private residences between intimates does not. It also helps explain 
why news tends to focus on dramatic criminal incidents, rather than 
abstract and complex debates around criminal justice policy. 
 
MORAL PANIC 
For Cohen (1972) the most dramatic demonstration of the news 
media’s power to shape crime consciousness is the creation of ‘moral 
panics’. This power is most productive at moments of cultural strain 
and ambiguity that challenge existing moral boundaries. First used by 
Young (1971) in his study of drug-takers, the concept was developed 
and extended by Cohen (1972) in his interactionist analysis of the 
simultaneous construction and demonization of Mods and Rockers in 
1960s Britain. Cohen traces the spiralling social reaction to these youth 
subcultures through initial intolerance, media stereotyping, moral 
outrage, increased surveillance, labelling and marginalization, and 
deviancy amplification that seemed to justify the initial concerns. The 
defiant misbehaviour of sexually and economically liberated youth 
affronted the post-War values of hard work, sobriety, and deferred 
gratification. For Cohen, at a time of rapid social change these 
subcultures were the visible manifestation of a world that was slipping 
away—‘folk devils’ who provided a crystallizing focus for social anxiety 
and ‘respectable fears’ and an agenda for journalists, politicians, and 
moral entrepreneurs. 
Hall et al. (1978) provided a Marxist explanation of news power 
in their analysis of a ‘mugging’ moral panic—with the ‘black mugger’ as 
‘folk devil’—which they read as an ideological intervention to address 
an escalating crisis in state hegemony. Building on Cohen (1972) and 
Chibnall (1977), they argue that the news media play a critical role in 
defining ‘for the majority of the population what significant events are 
taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to 
understand these events’ (Hall et al., 1978: 57). Crime news functions 
as a morality play ‘in which the ‘devil’ is both symbolically and 
physically cast out from the society by its guardians—the police and 
the judiciary’ (1978: 66). For Hall et al. (1978: 42) the news media 
orchestrate moral panics as a key ideological means through which ‘the 
‘silent majority’ is won over to the support of increasingly coercive 
measures by the state, and lends its legitimacy to a ‘more than normal’ 
exercise of control. 
Though both Chibnall (1977) and Hall et al. (1978) were writing 
from a Marxist perspective, they arrive at different understandings of 
news power. Chibnall (1977: 9–10) seeks to expose ‘the deficiencies in 
most Marxist approaches’ that ‘simply assert the function of the news 
media in reproducing a dominant ideology without explaining how it is 
achieved beyond referring to the media structure of ownership and 
control’. News values are central to the freedom of the press and the 
‘craft of journalism’. Chibnall’s bottom line is that journalistic ‘common 
sense’ will place ‘news values’ above other interests, including state 
interests, in selecting and constructing ‘news’. For Hall et al. (1978), the 
notion of journalistic autonomy is illusory. The news media function as 
part a wider ideological state apparatus within which journalists have 
limited autonomy: in the final instance, they sit in a position of 
‘structured subordination’ to the powerful sources upon whom they 
rely for newsworthy information. From Cohen’s interactionist 
perspective, everyone involved in a moral panic, including the news 
media, the authorities, and the folk devils, is in a state of panic. Each of 
these studies is concerned to illustrate how crime news stigmatizes and 
criminalizes the powerless. For Chibnall (1977) news power is 
understood primarily as professional practice. For Hall et al. (1978) it is 
ideological practice. For Cohen (1972) it is social practice. 
These two concepts—news values and moral panic—have 
provided generations of crime news researchers with all they need to 
examine the selection, production, distribution, and ‘effects’ of crime 
news. But the studies in which these concepts were developed were in 
depth analyses of social change that situated crime news within the 
wider contexts of generational conflict, the politics of law and order, or 
the transition to an authoritarian state. It is their more immediately 
reproducible elements that have survived, caricatured and detached 
from any wider contextual considerations. Thus crime news is 
researched in order to demonstrate taxonomically that ‘news values’ 
retain their explanatory value—reflecting Rock’s (1973) notion of news 
as ‘eternal recurrence’—and that the news media are still biased on 
the basis of gender, class, ethnicity, age, or sexuality. Or the news 
media and wider reaction to a putative social problem is examined in 
order to evaluate whether or not it constitutes a moral panic (see 
Jewkes 2015 for an overview). While these concepts still have much to 
offer the analysis of crime news, we would propose that their 
decontextualisation and taxonomical application does not do them 
justice, and has diverted research attention from the radical changes 
that have transformed the relations between news power, crime, and 
criminal justice in the past 40 years (for important exceptions see 
Ericson et al., 1987, 1989, 1991; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). 
Useful insights into these changes came from penologists, who 
were only peripherally interested in media. Analysts of the ‘punitive 
turn’, whose main concern was the rise of mass incarceration, noted 
the dominance of crime in public discourse and the extent to which its 
increasing everyday salience was reshaping electoral politics and 
reorienting crime control policy towards ‘quick fix’ solutions (Beckett 
1997; Bottoms 1995; Garland 2001a, b; Pratt 2007; Roberts et al. 2003; 
Sasson 1995). Perhaps because their starting point was attempting to 
understand the socio-economic and cultural transformations that were 
driving penal expansion, media were situated within that wider 
context. It is to this body of research that we turn next. 
 
NEWS POWER AND THE PUNITIVE TURN 
Hall (1979, 1980) used the term ‘authoritarian populism’ to explain 
how Thatcherism had harnessed public fears and anxieties to 
popularize neoliberal solutions to economic and political problems, 
including law and order. Building on Policing the Crisis (Hall et al. 1978), 
he argued that ‘authoritarian populism’ represented a fundamental 
ideological shift in which the UK conservative news media’s role was 
pivotal in criminalizing marginalized groups and legitimating punitive 
law and order policies. This shift would be difficult to reverse because 
it was intimately connected to the New Right’s attempt to create an 
authoritarian state and a free market. In the mid-1990s, following 
decades of rising crime rates, penologists identified the ‘punitive 
turn’—the adoption across many Anglophone jurisdictions of both the 
rhetoric and practice of ever-harsher punishments, including the 
extension of criminal law and criminalization, tougher policing and 
sentencing, and increased imprisonment. Bottoms (1995) argued that 
the rise of what he termed ‘populist punitiveness’ signalled a departure 
from the post-War consensus that curtailed the expression of 
excessively punitive sentiments and the politicization of criminal justice 
policy. Unlike Hall, for Bottoms this shift was unsustainable and would 
pass. Yet despite choosing the term ‘populist’, at no point does he 
consider the significance of news media in shaping ‘public opinion’. 
Though they were both interested in the law and order implications of 
the collapsing social democratic consensus, Hall’s cultural studies 
approach was sensitized to an appreciation of news power. From 
Bottoms’ policy-centric perspective, news power remained either 
invisible or insignificant. 
More recent penological work has given greater recognition to 
the role of mass media in driving the ‘punitive turn’. In Garland’s (2001: 
158) analysis of the UK and US, television has ‘tapped into, then 
dramatized and reinforced, a new public experience—an experience 
with profound psychological resonance—and in doing so it has 
institutionalised that experience’. By heightening consciousness, most 
significantly among the previously well-insulated middle classes, of the 
increasing risks of criminal victimization and the ineffectual and 
uncaring nature of criminal justice, it has provided ‘everyday 
opportunities to play out the emotions of fear, anger, resentment, and 
fascination that our experience of crime provokes’ (Garland: 2001: 
158). Roberts et al.’s (2003) comparative research on penal populism 
and public opinion highlights ‘the dynamic and powerfully co-
ordinating force of the media—framing not only reality to feed late 
modern anxieties but also telling stories about how to think about the 
remedies to the anxieties and what political actors are doing or failing 
to do in “making things better”’ (Roberts et al. 2003: 87). Their account 
of media influence draws heavily on Garland, but also identifies what 
they see as the malign outcomes of tabloid law and order campaigns. 
Pratt (2007) also acknowledges the importance of tabloid campaigning. 
His analysis offers a deeper understanding of a transforming media 
environment characterized by market deregulation, technological 
change, increased competition, and globalization. For Pratt (2007), the 
core media message is clear: citizens can no longer rely for public 
protection on a criminal justice system that seems more interested in 
protecting the rights of criminals. 
Across this body of work, a consistent ‘bad news’ view emerges. 
‘The media’ feed into the punitive turn by: over-concentrating on the 
threat posed by violent predatory offenders; emphasizing exceptional 
or aberrant crimes; identifying ‘new’ crimes requiring ‘new’ forms of 
punishment; employing simplified frames of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; 
highlighting injustices perpetrated against victims by a ‘soft’, 
ineffectual, and uncaring criminal justice system; attacking politicians, 
authority figures, and experts deemed to be ‘soft on crime’; 
questioning official explanations; and lending editorial support for 
retributive policies. The most significant development in the context of 
this chapter is the recognition of a more antagonistic relationship 
between the news media and state authority. Nevertheless, the 
consensus is that the punitive turn is reversible and that sections of the 
news media—a clear distinction is maintained between tabloid and 
broadsheet—are manageable. For Roberts et al. (2003), the UK 
tabloids are a lost cause. The challenge is keeping broadsheet 
journalists on-message through education by academic experts and 
policy elites. Specifically, a more accurate coverage of crime and 
criminal justice could be achieved by ‘pointing out the unintended 
consequences of irresponsible, sensationalised reporting’ and 
‘improving access to specialist staff such as statisticians and academics’ 
(Roberts et al. 2003: 175–6). We would suggest that this view 
underestimates and under-conceptualizes contemporary news power. 
In what follows, we develop this position through reference to two key 
processes: tabloidization and digitalization. These processes—central 
theoretical and empirical concerns within journalism and 
communication studies, but largely absent from criminological 
analysis—are key to understanding the dynamic and rapidly 
transforming relations between UK news power, crime and criminal 
justice. 
 RECONSTITUTING UK NEWS POWER: 
TABLOIDIZATION AND DIGITALIZATION 
In 1986 Rupert Murdoch relocated production of his UK national 
newspapers from the historic but technologically and spatially 
inadequate Fleet Street to new computerized, full-colour printing 
facilities in Wapping. His success was such that tabloid formats, 
techniques, and logics rapidly spread across the industry, and by 1989 
the last newspaper had left Fleet Street for upgraded premises (Lang 
and Dodkins 2011). New computer and printing technologies enabled 
newspapers to rationalize their workforces, while reformatting and 
sharpening their design, style, content, and competitive edge. But 
tabloidization was more than technological. It transformed journalistic 
practice and the nature of news itself by prioritizing scandal, sensation, 
and infotainment over in-depth political and economic coverage, and 
redefining the criteria that should be used in judging a person’s fitness 
for public office (Bird 1992; Conboy 2006; Franklin 1997; Sparks and 
Tulloch 2000). The tabloidization of the UK press also fundamentally 
transformed newspapers’ sense of their own power. As Tunstall puts it 
(1996: 30): 
 
. . . the national newspaper industry massively cut its costs and boosted 
its profits. The national press owners, managers and editors also 
boosted their own financial and political confidence. Rupert Murdoch’s 
success seemed to indicate that industrial power, political influence, 
and profitability were all consistent goals. All three could be pursued, 
and put in evidence, at the same time.  
 
Crime news was ideally suited to this new environment. As we have 
already shown, crime has always been a news staple, but tabloidisation 
transformed newspapers’ capacity to produce stories that could seize 
the public imagination. For the first time, full-colour images formed the 
centrepieces of increasingly graphic and emotionally charged crime 
and justice stories, adding a new dimension of dramatic realism that 
elevated the potential to invoke consumer empathy, shock and anger. 
Melodramatic headlines, moralistic interpretive frameworks and 
streamlined explanations—standard practice for decades—were 
augmented by a growing readiness to challenge official explanations 
and institutional authority (Turner, 1999; Reiner et al. 2000; Brock 
2013).  
As tabloidization was taking hold, newspapers were also 
experimenting with the Internet. Early attempts to go online enjoyed 
mixed success, with some being likened to a ‘dumping ground’ for 
news content. ‘Digital convergence’—the combination within a single 
portable device of, most significantly, Internet access, camera 
functionality, and messaging services—created the technological 
conditions in which the mass production and use of news-related 
content and services could flourish (Westlund 2013). As with 
tabloidization, however, digital convergence is more than just a 
technological shift. It ‘alters the relationship between existing 
technologies, industries, markets genres, and audiences. Convergence 
refers to a process, but not an endpoint’ (Jenkins 2004: 34). It has 
further transformed the nature and content of crime news and the 
cultural and regulatory environments in which it circulates. Three 
interconnected dynamics, at once fostered and intensified by digital 
convergence, are key: proliferation, interactivity and adversarialism. 
News media proliferation has resulted in countless platforms 
disseminating 24-7 breaking news globally. The main challenge facing 
news-hungry consumers has shifted from finding and accessing to 
choosing and filtering. Two decades after Wapping, Rupert Murdoch 
(2006) heralded a second revolution that would require further radical 
adaptation from newspapers if they were to retain their power: 
 
Power is moving away from those who own and manage the media to 
a new and demanding generation of consumers—consumers who are 
better educated, unwilling to be led, and who know that in a 
competitive world they can get what they want, when they want it. The 
challenge for us in the traditional media is how to engage with this new 
audience . . . There is only one way. That is by using our skills to create 
and distribute dynamic, exciting content . . . Content is being 
repurposed to suit the needs of a contemporary audience . . . The 
words, pictures and graphics that are the stuff of journalism have to be 
brilliantly packaged: they must feed the mind and move the heart [as] 
must read, must have content.  
 
National newspapers have responded to declining print readerships 
and the proliferation of online news platforms by developing digital 
operations with global reach, in the process transforming themselves 
into corporate news brands. A snapshot from August 2016 reveals that 
The Guardian newspaper sold fewer than 160,000 print copies per day, 
yet its mobile compatible website attracted more than 8 million daily 
unique browsers. Daily print sales of the Daily Mail, whilst eclipsing 
those of The Guardian ten-to-one, were still only 1.6 million. 
MailOnline averaged over 15 million daily unique browsers (ABC, 
http://www.abc.org.uk/). Corporate newspaper websites are 
constantly updated, rendering obsolete the physical, temporal, and 
geographical constraints of the printed format. In an increasingly 
crowded and competitive market, newspaper corporations are under 
ever-greater pressure to attract and retain fickle consumers. One 
effective mechanism for achieving this is interactivity. 
Boczkowski (2004: 21) notes that news has moved from being 
‘mostly journalist-centred, communicated as a monologue, and 
primarily local, to also being increasingly audience-centred, part of 
multiple conversations and micro-local’. The integration of video-
streaming and podcasting, real-time comments threads, and discussion 
groups, means that consumers are woven into the news process, 
submitting their views or, more importantly, sending or uploading their 
photographs and footage of crime and justice events. The 
transformation of this producer-source-consumer relationship was 
exemplified during and after the London bombings of 7 July 2005. The 
BBC’s Richard Sambrook (2005) recalled: 
 
Within 6 hours [of 7/7] we received more 1,000 photos, 20 pieces of 
amateur video, 4000 text messages, and 21,000 emails. People were 
participating in our coverage in a way we had never seen before. By 
the next day, our main evening television newscast began with a 
package edited entirely from video sent in by viewers. Our audiences 
had become involved like they never had before. By day’s end, the 
BBC’s newsgathering had crossed a Rubicon . . . Of course the BBC has 
used phone-ins, amateur video, and email in its programmes for years, 
but what was happening now was moving us way beyond where we’d 
been before.  
 
There was further movement during the 2011 London riots, when 
journalists, police officers, bystanders, rioters, and victims all 
contributed in real time to the creation of a multi-perspectival 
intermediatized crime news story (Lewis and Newburn 2011). The 
increased interactivity fostered by digital convergence means that 
consumers can become producers, ‘watchers’ can become ‘doers’, and 
everyone can be a ‘citizen reporter’. It is the interactive experience of 
crime news that matters. The nature of this interactivity can in turn be 
shaped by a third major transformation brought about by the mutually 
reinforcing processes of tabloidization and digitalization—increased 
adversarialism. 
Within a proliferating news market, one of the main ways in 
which newspaper corporations have sought to achieve distinction has 
been through the development of an increasingly adversarial style 
(Lloyd 2004; Milne 2005; Protess et al. 1991; Sabato, 1991). The growth 
of press adversarialism results from a range of interconnected factors. 
Some of these, as discussed above, are particular to rapidly 
transforming communications markets. Others, like the widely 
reported decline in deference to authority and a deterioration of public 
trust in official or elite institutions, reflect wider changes in values and 
culture (Misha, 2017; Fukuyama 2000; Seldon 2009). As McNair (2006: 
71) notes, a prominent characteristic of contemporary news coverage 
is its ‘negativism and wilfully destructive attitude towards authority’ 
(McNair 2006: 71). We propose that this adversarialism—
unprecedented in scope and ambition—lies at the heart of a new 
business model for newspaper corporations. Energized by 
tabloidization and digitalization, and committed to challenging 
establishment authority by investigating and exposing institutional 
failure, this business model is reconstituting news power in the UK. In 
the next section we illustrate the evolution of this business model by 
analysing the interconnected processes of trial by media, victim-
centred news campaigning, and scandal hunting. 
 
NEWS POWER, TRIAL BY MEDIA, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
Trial by media (TBM) is a form of populist justice in which individuals 
and institutions are judged in the intermediatized ‘court of public 
opinion’ (Greer and McLaughlin, 2011, 2012a, b, 2013). This digital 
‘court’ can be attended by media users across the globe, and anyone 
with an Internet connection can participate in the trial proceedings. 
The allegations underpinning TBM range across three overlapping 
categories of infraction: criminality, immorality and incompetence. The 
disruptive power of TBM resides in its capacity to generate an intense 
emotional public reaction that can redefine cultural, political and policy 
agendas. The nature and targets of these trials are diverse, and include 
(Greer and McLaughlin 2016): 
 naming and shaming public figures and institutions accused of:  
o acting as if they are above the law  
o offending against an assumed moral consensus 
o failing to deliver on obligations and responsibilities  
 pre-judging the outcome of criminal investigations involving 
‘unknowns’ 
 ‘retrying’ those considered to have evaded criminal justice 
 
Active participation—which may vary from posting speculation and 
opinion to submitting hard evidence to sharing ‘one-click’ judgement 
on the guilt or innocence of the accused—is integral to the immersive 
experience. Through this interactivity, TBM reclaims aspects of ‘justice’ 
from the courts and returns them to a networked citizenry. The extra-
legal news media investigation that forms a core part of TBM may 
uncover sufficient evidence to activate formal due process. TBM thus 
has the power to initiate legal proceedings that otherwise may not 
have occurred. But it also challenges and subverts due process. 
Inverting its defining principle, TBM cases are premised on a 
presumption of guilt. This presumption of guilt precipitates an 
intermediatized search for further ‘evidence’ that contributes to 
consolidating a public image of the accused as ‘guilty as charged’. 
While opinion and hearsay are generally regarded as inadmissible in a 
court of law, ‘evidence’ in TBM ranges from that which might be legally 
admissible to conjecture and insinuation. Newspaper corporations 
must only be convinced that it is sufficiently compelling to justify the 
risk of libel action. Those who deny the charges and attempt to fight 
back through public statements or legal retaliation risk intensified 
scrutiny aimed at uncovering further evidence of their guilt. Through 
the naming and shaming of alleged individual and institutional 
‘wrongdoers’, TBM orchestrates status degradation ceremonies that 
dramatize moral and ideological boundaries. TBM ritually transforms 
the public identity of individual or institutional actors. Its outcomes 
range from varying degrees of reputational damage, to criminal 
prosecution, the introduction of new regulatory frameworks, the 
transformation of institutional practice, and the reconfiguration of 
collective memory. 
The development of TBM as a criminal justice intervention 
played a key role in the investigative campaign, which was re-energized 
and restructured in the 1990s to establish market distinction and 
demonstrate newspapers’ growing sense of power. The shift at this 
time to campaigning across a range of hard and soft news issues 
emboldened UK newspapers in claiming to represent the ‘public 
interest’, and extended their traditional agenda setting role to one of 
overt advocacy and activism (Birks 2010). Through a series of high-
profile campaigns, different newspapers began pressurizing 
governments in the name of the public to take responsibility for a 
succession of institutional failures in the criminal justice system. Below 
we identify and analyse five exemplars that for us personify essential 
characteristics of this process, namely: failure through convicting the 
innocent; failure to convict the guilty; failure to protect children from 
paedophiles; failure to find missing children; and failure to provide 
competent criminal justice leadership. The development TBM through 
victim-centred campaigns allowed newspaper corporations to test the 
legal limits and consumer appeal of an evolving business model 
focused on the exposure of institutional failure.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE THROUGH CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT 
In the aftermath of successful ‘miscarriages of justice’ campaigns, most 
notably the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six, some liberal 
newspapers continued to investigate and campaign on behalf of 
individuals who it was claimed had been the subject of wrongful 
conviction and imprisonment (Greer and McLaughlin 2014). Logistically 
these ‘traditional’ campaigns are difficult to run as they are premised 
on the assumption that the criminal justice system is not only 
incompetent and ineffective, but almost certainly institutionally 
corrupt. In addition, it was difficult to generate public sympathy for 
individuals who had been convicted of high-profile murders. 
Nevertheless, there were notable successes, including overturned 
convictions in the cases of the Bridgewater Three in 1997, Derek 
Bentley in 1998, and Stephen Downing in 2002 (Huff and Killias, 2008). 
These campaigns were damaging to public confidence in criminal 
justice because they highlighted systemic incompetence or corruption 
in the wrongful conviction of innocent citizens and, in so doing, 
signalled that the real killer(s) were still at large. 
Other newspapers initiated campaigns on behalf of crime 
victims who had been failed by the criminal justice system. These 
campaigns were grounded in intense coverage of murders where the 
victims’ families proclaimed that ‘justice had not been done’ because a 
killer or killers had not been apprehended or prosecuted, or had 
received a light sentence or early release from prison. Two 
unprecedented ‘trial by media’ campaigns marked a watershed in UK 
newspaper corporations’ agenda-setting capacities. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO CONVICT THE GUILTY 
In February 1997 the inquest into the killing of Stephen Lawrence 
resumed. Despite various prosecution attempts, no-one had been 
convicted for the murder of the young black Londoner in a racially 
motivated attack in April 1993. During this inquest the five primary 
suspects refused to cooperate, claiming privilege against self-
incrimination (Cottle 2004). The verdict of unlawful killing ‘in a 
completely unprovoked racist attack by five white youths’ was already 
newsworthy because it exceeded the bounds of the jury’s instructions 
(Hall et al. 2013). Outraged by what was seen as the state’s inability to 
secure a conviction in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the 
Daily Mail took matters into its own hands. Its unprecedented front 
page on 14 February 1997 displayed full-colour photographs of the five 
suspects beneath the headline, ‘MURDERERS: The Mail accuses these 
men of killing. If we are wrong, let them sue us’ (see Figure 11.1). 
 
Figure 11.1 
Daily Mail front page 
Source: Daily Mail, 14 February 1997 
In publishing this front page the newspaper was in contempt of court, 
but no legal action was taken by the accused and the Daily Mail’s 
campaign for a public inquiry gathered momentum. That this 
newspaper championed the case was remarkable given its long history 
of overt hostility to campaigns around racial discrimination 
(McLaughlin 2005). The Macpherson Inquiry Report, released in 
February 1999, reached the historic conclusion that the Metropolitan 
Police was ‘institutionally racist’. It also implied institutional corruption 
by castigating police officers of all ranks for ‘fundamental errors’ that 
fatally undermined the investigation. The Daily Mail’s stark 
demonstration of news power sent shock waves across the criminal 
justice system, and sat uneasily with other sections of the British news 
media. A Guardian editorial (15 February 1997) praised the ‘powerful 
and bold stroke’ on behalf of the victim’s family, but expressed concern 
at the ‘trial by media’ methods and the precedent they set. This 
precedent established the foundations for the next stage in the 
evolution of trial by media-driven campaigning in a tabloidized market 
on the cusp of digitalization. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM 
PAEDOPHILES 
In July 2000 eight-year-old Sarah Payne disappeared from her home in 
Sussex. The search for Sarah dominated the national news agenda for 
three weeks, not least because the parents believed she had been 
abducted by a paedophile. They were proved right (Payne 2005). 
Convicted paedophile, Roy Whiting, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for Sarah’s abduction and murder in December 2001. It 
transpired that Whiting had previously abducted and sexually assaulted 
an eight-year-old girl, was one of the first individuals to be included on 
the 1997 Sex Offenders Register, and had benefitted from early prison 
release. With the full support of Sarah’s parents, the News of the 
World—the UK’s bestselling Sunday newspaper—launched a two-
pronged ‘For Sarah’ crusade (Pratt 2007). It demanded that 
paedophiles receive life sentences and the government pass a ‘Sarah’s 
Law’ giving parents the right to know whether paedophiles were living 
in their community. The News of the World’s position was that the lack 
of such a law had cost Sarah’s life. 
Sarah’s mother, Sara Payne, quickly became the campaign’s 
most high-profile ambassador and a tireless advocate of Sarah’s Law. 
The News of the World adopted an unprecedented ‘naming and 
shaming’ strategy, having already threatened to build its own online 
public database of convicted UK paedophiles. On 23 and 30 July 2000 it 
published the names, photographs, and locations of 82 alleged known 
paedophiles and set up a telephone hotline for readers to provide 
information on the whereabouts of others (see Figure 11.2). 
 
Figure 11.2 
News of the World front page 
Source: © News of the World. News Syndication, 23 July 2000 
The News of the World vowed to identify all 110,000 known 
paedophiles in the UK, citing as justification a MORI poll of 614 adults 
that showed 84 per cent thought paedophiles should be named and 88 
per cent would want to know if one was living in their community. In 
directly identifying paedophiles the News of the World, like the Daily 
Mail in the Stephen Lawrence case, was taking the law into its own 
hands. It quickly stood accused of creating a lynch mob atmosphere 
driven by trial by media. Innocent people were indeed attacked 
(Silverman and Wilson 2002). After well-publicized meetings with the 
Home Office and criminal justice agencies the News of the World 
suspended its ‘naming and shaming’ campaign on 6 August 2000. The 
campaign did not succeed in establishing all its proposed reforms, but 
the government was forced to tighten up controls over paedophiles. 
After more than a decade of pressure, a child sex offender disclosure 
scheme known as ‘Sarah’s Law’ became operational in England and 
Wales in April 2011 (Jones and Newburn 2013). This scheme allows 
members of the public to ask the police if individuals in contact with 
their children pose a risk. 
Newspaper campaigning in the UK changed as a result of the 
Stephen Lawrence and Sarah Payne murders. The Daily Mail and News 
of the World campaigns were potent demonstrations of news power, 
dominating the news agenda, imposing interpretive order, galvanizing 
public opinion, triggering national debates, and pressurizing politicians, 
policy-makers, and criminal justice professionals to acknowledge 
systemic failures. Doreen Lawrence and Sara Payne personified how 
the violent actions of dangerous criminals, aided and abetted by a 
malfunctioning criminal justice system, could destroy innocent lives 
and families (Charman and Savage, 2009). Both women acquired 
celebrity status and political prominence, and were officially 
recognized by the state for their efforts as inspirational mothers who 
had produced significant transformations in criminal law, professional 
practice, and social attitudes. After a succession of public awards, 
Doreen Lawrence was elevated to the House of Lords as a Baroness in 
2013. Sara Payne became the Government’s first Victims’ Champion in 
2009. Together, the Stephen Lawrence and Sarah Payne cases 
established a new template containing all the components necessary 
to run a successful victim-centred campaign in a tabloidized and 
digitalized news market. These components include: 
1. ideal victims murdered in horrific circumstances; 
2. suspected or convicted killers who can be demonized; 
3.. evidence of institutional failure; 
4. family representatives—ideally a mediagenic inspirational 
matriarch—with core values and characteristics that 
make them instantly recognizable campaign figureheads 
capable of: 
 stimulating public identification and empathy; 
 communicating loss, pain, frustration, and anger 
continuously through news conferences, interviews, 
the release of family photographs, and participation 
in high-profile police and public commemoration 
events; 
 crafting and disseminating powerful public 
biographies that further idealize the victims, who 
might become posthumous celebrities; 
 campaigning for reforms that transcend their own 
tragic personal circumstances and offer future 
protection to others. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO FIND MISSING CHILDREN 
Three-year-old Madeleine McCann disappeared on 3 May 2007 from a 
holiday apartment in Praia da Luz, Portugal. The case generated 
unprecedented global media attention and contained many of the 
components required for a successful victim-centred campaign: an 
ideal victim; an inspirational matriarch in Kate McCann, who was 
prepared to work tirelessly with the media and able to construct a 
powerful public biography of her missing child; the suspicion that 
Madeleine had been kidnapped by a paedophile; and evidence of 
institutional failure in the allegedly bungled Portuguese police 
investigation. In a rapidly evolving digital environment, Madeleine was 
intermediatized in a way that would have been technologically 
impossible with Stephen Lawrence and Sarah Payne. The photogenic 
three-year-old girl was converted into an iconic global image and a 
profitable news commodity (see Figure 11.3). 
 
 Figure 11.3 
‘Find Madeleine’ poster 
Source: 
http://findmadeleine.com/support/light/download_materials/english/english_poster
1_0.pdf 
Kate and Gerry McCann—white, mediagenic, middle-class doctors—
proactively engaged with journalists to try and maximize the news 
visibility of the case and manage the news agenda. For a period several 
UK newspapers offered the McCanns unequivocal support by throwing 
their weight behind the Find Madeleine campaign. Unlike in the UK, 
however, there was no culture of formalized dialogue between the 
Portuguese police and the news media, so when the investigation 
failed to produce a breakthrough the news vacuum needed to be filled. 
Seemingly unrestrained by UK contempt and libel laws, several UK 
newspaper corporations demonstrated the destructive capacity of 
news power. Over several months, a succession of stories based on 
unofficial sources, police leaks, speculation and rumour insinuated that 
Kate and Gerry McCann were responsible for their daughter’s death, 
had disposed of her body, and had conspired to cover up their actions 
by deliberately diverting police attention from evidence that would 
expose their guilt (Statement in Open Court, available at 
http://www.carter-ruck.com; Greer and McLaughlin 2012; Greer 2017).  
The McCanns began a legal action that resulted in several 
newspaper corporations making public apologies and substantial 
donations to the Find Madeline fund. Their libellous treatment figured 
prominently in the Leveson Inquiry into UK press abuses ranging from 
industrial scale phone hacking and paying corrupt police officers for 
tip-offs to harassing celebrities and crime victims 
(<IBT>http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/</IBT>). In their evidence to 
the inquiry the McCanns described how false and malicious news 
coverage had undermined the search for their daughter and subjected 
them to attempted blackmail and sustained trial by media (ibid). Kate 
McCann explained how she felt ‘worthless’ and ‘mentally raped’ after 
extracts from a private diary were reprinted in a tabloid newspaper 
without her permission (Daily Telegraph, 17 November, 2011: 2).  
This case illustrates a period in the evolution of UK newspaper 
corporations’ new business model when the convergence of 
tabloidization and digitalization produced a remarkable state of 
anomie within sections of the market. What began as a story of the 
institutional failure of the Portuguese police ended as a story of the 
institutional failure of the British press. The McCanns’ evidence played 
an important role in the Leveson inquiry’s attempt to redraw ethical 
boundaries around journalistic practice and, in so doing, to set limits on 
trial by media.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPETENT CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE LEADERSHIP 
Sir Ian Blair was the first Metropolitan Police Commissioner to struggle 
with the tabloidized and digitalized news developments described in 
this chapter. Considered too liberal from the outset by the 
conservative press, Blair was the target for an unrelenting trial by 
media that decimated his ‘natural’ position as the UK’s most senior 
police officer. The tipping point in Blair’s trial by media came at a 
Metropolitan Police Authority monthly meeting. When challenged on 
the unequal resourcing of murder investigations, he stated that the 
Metropolitan Police allocated resources to murders in accordance with 
the difficulty of the investigation. He then asserted that the news 
media were institutionally racist in how they reported murders. Blair 
further questioned news media selectivity by asking why the 
disappearance and murder of two ten-year-old Soham girls, Holly Wells 
and Jessica Chapman—which precipitated the biggest police manhunt 
in British history, received so much news attention in August 2002. 
The reaction was overwhelmingly hostile. Newspapers 
reproduced high-profile coverage of black and Asian murder victims as 
‘proof’ that they were not racist in their reporting practices. The Daily 
Mail reprinted its ground-breaking ‘Murderers’ front page naming 
Stephen Lawrence’s alleged killers. But Blair attracted an entirely 
different order of criticism for the Soham murders comment. He was 
lambasted across newspaper front pages for daring to question the 
newsworthiness of the abduction and murder of Holly Wells and 
Jessica Chapman. The following morning Blair made an unreserved ‘on 
air’ apology on BBC Radio 4 for any offence his comments might have 
caused the murdered girls’ families (Blair 2009). But the fallout of the 
Soham remarks coalesced with a hostile political environment to make 
his Commissionership untenable (Greer and McLaughlin 2011). Calling 
the press institutionally racist was a provocation for certain journalists, 
who quickly rebutted the claim. Questioning the newsworthiness of 
the murder of two ten-year-old girls was inexcusable. 
In meticulous detail, Blair was (de)constructed as an 
organizational liability who had lost his grip on Scotland Yard, forfeited 
the respect of the rank-and-file, and exhausted political support. Over 
time, the words and images that came to constitute Blair’s news media 
identity were those of a ‘politicized’, ‘operationally compromised’, and 
‘gaffe-prone’ Commissioner. As columnist and former Times editor 
Simon Jenkins (2006) put it: 
 London’s police chief, Sir Ian Blair, is being dragged into the street by a 
mob of journalists and politicians, blood-stained but still twitching. He 
is taunted, spat at, kicked and beaten. The editor of the Sun is looking 
for a gibbet, and of the Mail for a rope. Politicians are queuing to 
thwack the horse from under the gallows. 
 
After three years of unyielding trial by media, Sir Ian Blair resigned 
from post on 2 October 2008. He was the first Commissioner to do so 
since Sir Charles Warren in 1888, who stepped down for failing to catch 
Jack the Ripper. Sir Ian Blair’s trial by media did more than delegitimize 
one particular Commissioner. It clarified what ‘type’ of Commissioner 
and policing philosophy would be acceptable to the UK conservative 
national press. Further, it set a precedent for police–media relations 
and established a new set of reputational risks that would have to be 
managed by anyone seeking to become the UK’s most senior police 
officer (Greer and McLaughlin 2011). Sir Ian Blair’s successor, Sir Paul 
Stephenson, became the second Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
since 1888 to resign before term, as a result of the News of the World 
phone hacking scandal of 2011. The favourite to succeed him, Sir Hugh 
Orde, withdrew from the contest in the midst of his own publicly 
humiliating trial by media (Greer and McLaughlin 2012c). The 
successful candidate, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, became the third 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner since 1888 to resign before term. 
The same conservative newspapers that had initially offered qualified 
support undermined Hogan-Howe’s Commissionership through trial by 
media following a botched police investigation into historical child 
sexual abuse in which Field Marshall Lord Brammall was publicly 
named as a suspected paedophile in the absence of any credible 
evidence (Henriques 2016). 
 
NEWS POWER, SCANDAL HUNTING AND MEDIA 
JUSTICE 
Newspaper corporations are still learning how to maximize the impact 
of trial by media. The ethically questionable tactics used by certain 
journalists to gather information in the past, such as industrial-scale 
phone hacking, were finally outlawed by the Leveson inquiry. One of 
the most remarkable periods in the history of British journalism 
resulted in the closure of the 168-year-old flagship tabloid, the News of 
the World, journalists being prosecuted, and newspaper corporations 
settling substantial civil claims (Keeble and Mair 2012; Davies 2015). 
This anomic moment appears to have precipitated a recalibration and 
refocusing of the relations between news power, crime, and criminal 
justice. As UK newspaper corporations continue to learn from their 
mistakes, and their successes, there has emerged an even more 
ambitious form of news campaigning, directed not just at powerful 
public figures but at Britain’s core institutions and government. In a 
digitally-led news environment characterized by ever-increasing 
proliferation, interactivity and adversarialism, newspaper corporations 
have taken their business model to the next level: from portraying 
individual institutional failures to exposing systemic institutional 
scandal.  
The overlapping categories of infraction that underpin scandals 
are the same as those that drive trial by media; criminality, immorality 
and incompetence. However, while anyone can potentially become a 
target for TBM, scandals implicate the institutionally powerful—high-
profile individuals or institutions whose official position carries the 
expectation of upholding clearly defined moral or ethical principles. 
The infractions are sufficiently shocking that their public revelation 
triggers a powerful negative social reaction that can have life-changing 
reputational consequences for the protagonists (Greer and McLaughlin 
2013, 2015). Though diverse, we would argue that scandals progress 
through consistent phases—hunting, latency, activation, reaction, 
amplification, and accountability. These phases are illustrated in Figure 
11.4. (see also Greer and McLaughlin 2016). Scandal hunting in the UK 
has traditionally been viewed as the archetypal tabloid news practice: 
cheap, sensationalist, salacious, exploitative, and a distraction from 
‘real’ news. However, institutional scandal hunting is now practiced by 
all of the UK’s newspaper corporations and a multitude of online news 
and social media sites. Scandal hunting involves: 
 sting operations to catch public figures engaging in scandalous 
behaviours; 
 investigating rumours and allegations that might in turn result in a 
new scandal scoop; 
 inviting members of the public and whistleblowers to share 
scandalous information. 
While scandals may be activated – or claimed – and subsequently 
‘owned’ by particular newspaper corporations, they will 
intermediatised across digital platforms and inflected in accordance 
with ideological position. In addition to being commercially valuable, 
scandal hunting is inherently political. There is no shortage of high-
profile examples: the politicians’ expenses scandal (Daily Telegraph 
2009); the WikiLeaks’s scandal triggered by the release of confidential 
US national security and diplomatic documents (Guardian, New York 
Times, Der Spiegel 2010); the phone-hacking scandal that resulted in 
the closure of the News of the World (Guardian 2011); the mass 
surveillance scandal resulting from the document leak by National 
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden (Guardian 2013); the 
Panama Papers scandal revealing the offshore tax avoidance 
behaviours of the world’s rich and powerful (Guardian 2016); 
international sports scandals resulting from the exposure of 
institutionalized corruption at the highest levels (Times and Sunday 
Times, 2016); the UK Football Association scandal resulting from the 
exposure of corruption in the transfer market (Daily Telegraph, 2016); 
historical child sex abuse scandals implicating dozens of UK football 
clubs (Guardian and Daily Mirror 2016). However, if the Stephen 
Lawrence and Sarah Payne cases established a template to guide UK 
newspapers’ orchestration of victim-centred campaigns, the Sir Jimmy 
Savile case has established a template for the activation and 
amplification of institutional scandal. 
 
 
Figure 11.4 
Institutional scandal model 
 
Sir Jimmy Savile (1926–2011) was a BBC celebrity, philanthropist, and 
friend of the establishment. One year after his death, in October 2012, 
a television documentary claimed that Savile was also a sexual 
predator who for decades had used his celebrity status to abuse 
teenage girls. This documentary activated an intermediatized trial by 
media that destroyed Savile’s reputation and implicated the BBC—the 
institution that catapulted him to superstardom—into an extraordinary 
institutional child sex abuse scandal. The BBC’s initial reaction—denial 
of knowledge and responsibility—triggered another trial by media that 
amplified the scandal from the individual problem of Savile’s offending 
to the institutional problem of the BBC’s failure, denial, and cover-up. 
As police and, crucially, news media investigations uncovered more 
alleged victims and offenders, the scandal escalated and amplified 
across numerous public institutions. (Greer and McLaughlin 2016). 
Police investigations resulted in the questioning, and in some cases 
high-profile arrest and prosecution, of aging celebrities and public 
figures accused of historical sexual assaults. All of those accused 
publicly denied their guilt. Only some were convicted, but all were 
subjected to a shaming intermediatized trial by media. Child protection 
organizations reported that the ‘Savile effect’ had led to a dramatic 
increase in reports of child sexual abuse. The Independent Inquiry into 
Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was established in 2015 to investigate the 
extent to which ‘institutions have failed in their duty of care to protect 
children from sexual abuse and exploitation’ 
(https://www.iicsa.org.uk/about-us/terms-of-reference). In addition to 
being the UK’s most large-scale and wide-ranging public inquiry, the 
IICSA is also its most intermediatized to date. The inquiry’s remit, the 
credibility of those appointed as chair, the appointment process itself, 
and the character and competence of inquiry members have all been 
scrutinized across news and social media forums. Trial by media 
remains an ever-present risk for anyone deemed unacceptable. As we 
illustrated above, the charge of institutional failure to provide 
competent criminal justice leadership has become a particular focus for 
newspaper corporations’ moral outrage. The first three Chairs of the 
IICSA, Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, Fiona Woolf, and Justice Lowell 
Goddard, were all subjected to trial by media. All resigned in 
humiliating circumstances. In the context of UK newspaper 
corporations’ reconstituted sense of adversarial power, most 
dramatically evidenced through trial by media and institutional scandal 
hunting, even public inquiries now run the risk of becoming part of the 
scandal they have been established to manage. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have set out our position on the transformation of 
news power that is reshaping crime consciousness and criminal justice 
rhetoric, practice and policy in the UK. Crime will always be 
newsworthy, and therefore profitable as a news category, because it 
works across the emotional registers of fear, anger, and fascination. 
Criminologists must continue to research the processes through which 
crime news is selectively produced and the public reaction it generates. 
This programme of research should of course include continued 
analysis of the functioning of news values and of the conditions under 
which we might justifiably say that the social reaction to crime 
constitutes a moral panic. But for such concept-testing analyses to be 
meaningful—for them to move beyond their taxonomical application—
they must be informed by a broader and deeper appreciation of a 
rapidly transforming tabloidized and digitalized news market. We have 
argued that, as a result of criminology’s failure to keep pace with 
recent transformations, the dramatic reconstitution of contemporary 
news power remains under-researched and under-conceptualized. 
The news media have always been a key site where justice is 
seen to be done. Today, however, UK newspaper corporations are 
redefining what justice is, and how it can and should be achieved. 
Victim-centred campaigns are exposing the scandalous institutional 
failure of the UK criminal justice system to provide public protection. In 
a context of heightened crime consciousness and declining confidence 
in the effectiveness of contemporary governance, trial by media is 
creating and delivering an alternative and highly distinctive form of 
justice. Media justice is a parallel and, at times, more visible, easily 
intelligible, and immediately impactful justice paradigm than that 
represented by the increasingly dysfunctional criminal justice process. 
Digital news sites have become platforms not only for the generation 
of intermediatized crime and justice debates and campaigns, but also 
for immersive participation in the naming and shaming of individuals 
and institutions. Though the criminal justice system retains the 
executive power to legally prosecute and sentence offenders, 
newspaper corporations are pre-empting and circumventing due 
process by pronouncing on guilt or innocence and, if the judgement is 
guilty, administering their own form of retribution. Media justice at 
once invokes, channels and expresses moral outrage. Its unique form 
of extra-judicial punishment is administered through destroying the 
credibility and reputation of ‘guilty’ individuals or institutions. Its core 
mechanisms—trial by media and institutional scandal hunting—form 
the basis of a business model that has been adopted by all UK 
newspaper corporations. Institutional scandal hunting, activation and 
amplification, premised on maximum exposure and maximum moral 
outrage, is further complicating the state’s capacity for governance by 
reconfiguring the power relations between newspaper corporations, 
networked citizens, and an already scandal-ridden criminal justice 
system. 
 
SELECTED FURTHER READING 
Greer (ed.), Crime and Media: A Reader (2010) is an annotated 
collection of key contributions covering many of the issues discussed in 
this chapter. Illuminating studies of the production of crime news are 
Chibnall, Law and Order News: An Analysis of Crime Reporting (1977) 
and the trilogy by Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, Visualising Deviance, 
Negotiating Control, and Representing Order (1987, 1989, 1991 
respectively); Schlesinger and Tumber’s Reporting Crime (1994); Greer, 
Sex Crime and the Media (2003/2012) and ‘News Media Criminology’ 
(2010). The most important studies of moral panic remain Cohen, Folk 
Devils and Moral Panics (1973/2002) and Hall, et al., Policing the Crisis 
(1978). Overview texts on crime and media are Carrabine, Crime, 
Culture, and the Media (2008) and Jewkes, Media and Crime (2015). 
Key articles on trial by media and institutional scandal hunting are 
Greer and McLaughlin, ‘The Sir Jimmy Savile scandal: Child sexual 
abuse and institutional denial at the BBC’ (2013) and Greer and 
McLaughlin,‘Theorizing institutional scandal and the regulatory state’ 
(2016). The journal Crime Media Culture: An International Journal 
(London: Sage) is a key source for current and relevant articles. 
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